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Humanity or justice?
Stan van Hooft∗
Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood 3125, Australia
This paper reflects on a critique of cosmopolitanism mounted by Tom Campbell, who argues
that cosmopolitans place undue stress on the issue of global justice. Campbell argues that aid
for the impoverished needy in the third world, for example, should be given on the Principle of
Humanity rather than on the Principle of Justice. This line of thought is also pursued by
‘Liberal Nationalists’ like Yael Tamir and David Miller. Thomas Nagel makes a similar
distinction and questions whether the ideal of justice can even be meaningfully applied on
a global scale. The paper explores whether the distinction between the Principle of
Humanity and the Principle of Justice might be a false dichotomy in that both principles
could be involved in humanitarian assistance. It will suggest that both principles might be
grounded in an ethics of caring and that the ethics of caring cannot be so sharply
distinguished from the discourse of justice and of rights. As a result, the Principle of
Humanity and the Principle of Justice cannot be so sharply distinguished either. It is
because we care about others as human beings (Principle of Humanity) that we pursue
justice for them (Principle of Justice) and the alleviation of their avoidable suffering.
Keywords: humanitarianism; justice; liberal nationalism; caring; moral motivation; moral
sentimentalism
Introduction
Cosmopolitanism has always involved a strong commitment to global justice and many cosmo-
politan thinkers have advocated the extension of principles of justice that apply to the political
and economic institutions of nation-states to the global political and economic system (Beitz
1999; Brock 2009; Pogge 1989; Shue 1996). However, in his keynote address at the 2008
Conference of the International Global Ethics Association in Australia, Tom Campbell argued
that, with this focus on global justice, cosmopolitanism systematically devalues the role of
the Principle of Humanity. In contrast, Campbell advocates a ‘radical progressivism’ that
could well take on board the idea that a strong principle of humanity that gives moral priority to the
eradication of suffering followed by the enhancement of human wellbeing for their own sakes is to be
preferred to a desert-based principle of justice in which those and only those who cause harm have an
overriding duty to correct or compensate for it. In which case, while both humanity and justice may
feature within the cosmopolitan moral armory, the general rule would be: ‘humanity before justice’.
(Campbell 2010, 135)
We are to understand the ‘Principle of Humanity’ as the norm that we should help anyone who is
in need simply because they are our fellow human beings who are in need. In the field of inter-
national relations and global issues, its most obvious manifestation is the assistance given to
countries, peoples and individuals who are the victims of natural disasters such as earthquakes,
hurricanes or tsunamis. Such assistance is given on the basis that rescuing people, providing
emergency health-care, and rebuilding homes and infrastructure is to be provided by those
who have the capacity to do so to those who are in need and who do not have the capacity to
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provide it to themselves. This would be an expression of simple human solidarity and of the con-
viction that human beings should help each other when there is dire need (Appiah 2006; O’Neill
2000; Singer 2002). Whether it is a case of one person helping another, of a national government
setting up welfare provisions for its needy citizens, or government agencies and non-government
organisations providing emergency relief to whole communities, the fundamental justification is
that there are people in need and other people with the capacity to help them. The only reason that
it is most frequently the rich nations who provide such help to victims in poor countries is that they
have the capacity to do so. While the poverty of the country that has suffered the catastrophe
might well be a contributing factor to the extent of the damage caused by the disaster, the aid
is given without regard to the disparity in wealth between donor and recipient and is in no way
motivated by a felt need to redress any injustices that might be the cause of that disparity.
Campbell contrasts the principle of humanity with the principle of justice. This latter prin-
ciple urges us to assist the poor – whether their plight results from natural disasters or from sys-
temic economic and political factors – because their poverty is a violation of their human rights
or the result of the failure on the part of rich countries and peoples to fulfil their positive and
negative duties of providing fair and appropriate opportunities for economic and political
advancement to the poor (Brock and Brighouse 2005; Brock 2009; Caney 2005; Pogge 2002).
If everyone has a right to the provision of basic subsistence, and if social goods should be dis-
tributed impartially and equitably among all the world’s peoples, then the overcoming of dire
poverty and inequity around the world becomes an issue of justice. A further feature of this prin-
ciple is that it places the focus of our attention upon institutions and systemic arrangements.
Rather than responding directly to the needs of individuals and groups, considerations of
justice look to classes and categories of people and to those institutional or systemic relations
between them which have the effect of consistently giving some classes and categories political
and economic advantages which they have not deserved or earned in ways open to all.
It is sometimes thought that there are differences in stringency between these two principles.
The principle of humanity is often thought of as charity motivated by a spirit of concern and
generosity rather than of obligation. In this form, the principle of humanity is considered super-
erogatory in the sense that it presents us with courses of action that it would be admirable to
follow, but which are not obligatory. Others argue that the actions which the principle enjoins
are genuine duties and where we are asked to respond to a great need our duty is proportionately
stringent (Singer 1972, 2009). In contrast, the principle of justice is often presented as the more
stringent – especially when it is supported by arguments which show that those who benefit from
the economic systems which impoverish the poor are the ones who have the duty to redress those
wrongs.1 Indeed, it is this claim which has led many to prefer the principle of justice to that of
humanity when considering the plight of the global poor. For the purposes of this paper I will
assume that the stringency of both principles is a function of the acuteness of the need to
which they respond.
In this paper, my first hypothesis will be that the principle of humanity establishes duties and
obligations which are no more supererogatory and no less stringent than those established by the
principle of justice. What might be the basis of the duties that arise from the principle of human-
ity? Why am I obliged to help someone in need simply because they are a fellow human being
who is in need? Peter Singer assumes that there is an obvious answer to this question in his
groundbreaking argument for assisting the distant poor – the one that appeals to the scenario
of the drowning child in the pond. As is well known, Singer appeals to our intuition that we
have an obligation to assist that child in order to argue that, because that scenario is an analogue
for the situation that we are all constantly in: namely, that there are distant children dying and we
have the capacity to save them, we have a duty to help distant children which is just as stringent
as our duty to help the drowning child in front of us. In all of the extensive literature that this
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argument has given rise to, there are not many who explore the basis of the initial intuition that
we have a duty to save the drowning child in front of us. This duty would seem to be an
expression of the principle of humanity. The child is a fellow human being in dire need and
we have the capacity to meet its need. So we should act.2 But the principle of humanity does
not explicate this obligation; it merely expresses it in more general terms. Why should I help
anyone who is in need? It may be that we are psychologically disposed to do so – especially
in cases where I am confronted by the need in close proximity to me – but this would be a
naturalistic explanation where a normative grounding is needed.
My second hypothesis will be that what motivates adherence to the principle of humanity
and so justifies its stringency is a moral sentiment that I call ‘caring-about-others’ (van Hooft
1995). Some people speak of it as sympathy, others as empathy, but the key point is that it is an
other-regarding emotion which seeks the well-being of that other for his or her own sake. It is
an expression of a deep motivational and normative structure of human existence which results
from the kind of upbringing and ethical formation in which caring is bestowed upon a young
person who thereby learns to extend caring to others. While not all individuals benefit from
such an upbringing and while various forms of psychological harm may vitiate it, caring-
about-others may be assumed to be sufficiently widespread to count as a naturalistic norm
for all.
Our caring-about-others takes differing forms in differing contexts. In the context of the
family, it will take the form of parental or filial affection and concern. In the context of friend-
ship, it will take forms of affection and willingness to share burdens suitable to friendship. In the
context of communities, it will take the form of solidarity and the willingness to come to the help
of one’s fellows. And in the context of global problems of poverty and inequity, it will take
different forms again – forms which it is the task of this paper to explore.
In order to understand the role of caring-about-others in motivating the principle of human-
ity, we will also need to ask whether it is realistic to expect that relationships of care extend to all
human beings no matter how far away they are from us, geographically and culturally. The forms
of caring-about-others that I have mentioned would seem to allow one to give priority to those,
like family, friends and compatriots, with whom one has a special relationship. We will need to
explore whether this makes the principle of humanity inconsistent with the sort of universalism
advocated by cosmopolitans on behalf of the principle of justice.3 Cosmopolitans question the
importance of the sovereignty of nation-states in the context of caring about others and see
the nationality of people as morally unimportant when considering their needs and their
human rights in the context of global economic and political arrangements. But this, in turn,
raises questions about the scope of the principle of justice. Does it apply globally, or does it
apply only within nation-states?
My third hypothesis is that caring-about-others motivates the principle of justice just as it
motivates the principles of humanity. Accordingly, the scope of both principles will be estab-
lished by the scope of our caring-about-others. This scope can and ought to be universal. It
will turn out that the differences between the principles of humanity and of justice are not as
profound as Campbell seems to think.
Moral sentimentalism
Does my advocacy of caring-about-others as a motivation for both the principle of humanity and
the principle of justice amount to ‘moral sentimentalism’? Am I right to assume that if whatever
motivates adherence to a principle is a morally good motivation, the principle is thereby justified
and given normative validity? One thinker who thinks so is Michael Slote. Slote thinks that
caring in the form of empathy can ground the whole of morality. As he puts it,
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I believe that empathy and the notion of empathic caring for or about others offer us a plausible
criterion of moral evaluation. Differences in (the strength of) normally or fully developed human
empathy correspond pretty well, I think, to differences of intuitive moral evaluation, and that fact
(if I can demonstrate that it is one) will allow an ethics of caring that brings in empathy – an
ethics of empathic caring – to give a fairly general account of both public/political and private/
individual morality. (Slote 2007, 16)
Slote is not troubled by the objection that if our obligations were measured by our empathies,
then it would be legitimate for us to prioritise our particularist concerns for our own people, reli-
gion, ethnicity, nation, or tribe over our universalist duties towards more distant others. If our
empathy is stronger in relation to people who are close to us or whom we know than in relation
to those who are strangers to us and whom we only know about, our obligations to those who are
near will be greater. Accordingly, the scope and stringency of our duties correspond to the scope
and stringency of our empathy. It is strongest for family and friends, less strong, but still signifi-
cant for compatriots, and least strong for distant strangers. Accordingly, when he considers
Singer’s argument, Slote counters with the claim that my duties to children who are close to
me or to the children in my own community are more stringent than those to distant others.
Turning to the issue of justice, Slote says that the justice of institutions and laws can be
assessed by seeing the extent to which they are expressive of empathy. As he puts it, ‘A law is
just if it reflects or expresses empathically caring motivation towards their compatriots on the
part of the legislative group that is responsible for passing it’ (Slote 2007, 95). I will leave to
one side that this ignores the international responsibilities of legislatures when they make laws
that impact upon international relations and trade. Even disregarding the global dimension, this
account of justice at the domestic level is inadequate. Slote’s focus on empathy leads him to
suggest that any distributive arrangement is just so long as there is a safety net. Insofar as the
justice of a social arrangement is a function of how much compassion or empathy is shown for
those least likely to benefit from that arrangement, a legislature that ensures that there is provision
for the relief of poverty and disadvantage would be fulfilling all of its duties of justice. This view
fails to consider, however, how poverty and disadvantage may have come about. Even if it is the
result of exploitation and entrenched privilege, the outcome is deemed to be just so long as a safety
net is provided from a motivation of empathy for the losers.
It would seem then that it is not adequate to justify actions or policies simply by saying that
they are motivated by caring-about-others. Nor is it valid to reduce the principle of justice to the
principle of humanity if the latter is understood as an indiscriminate expression of caring-about-
others. Justifications based on the moral sentiment of caring-about-others will have to be
sensitive to the different forms that caring-about-others takes in different contexts. In some
contexts, it will take the form of the principle of humanity and in other contexts, it will take
the form of the principle of justice. And in either case, the normativity of the principle will
have to be established on grounds other than the motivation of caring-about-others.
Liberal nationalism
One form that the sentiment of caring-about-others takes has come to be known as ‘Liberal
Nationalism’, which asserts that one’s membership of a nation-state as a citizen of that
nation-state sets the parameters of one’s duties of justice towards those who are in need and
that our duties to others who are not co-nationals arise from the principle of humanity and are
therefore of a different kind.
An early advocate of this position was Yael Tamir. Tamir refers to the concept of a ‘nation’
rather than that of the ‘nation-state’. Whereas a state or a nation-state is a political entity defined
by the possession of a monopoly of power within a given territory and over a given population, a
nation is seen as a cultural entity. For Tamir, ‘A group is defined as a nation if it exhibits both
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a sufficient number of shared, objective characteristics – such as language, history or territory –
and self-awareness of its distinctiveness’ (Tamir 1993, 66). However, she does not claim that
each of such objective factors as a common religion, tradition, ethnicity or language is
crucial. The only factor that is necessary, although not sufficient, for a group to be defined as
a nation is the existence of a relevant attitude on the part of members. It is subjectivity that
defines a nation. A nation is, in the well-known phrase, an ‘imagined community’. Accordingly,
Tamir (1993, 65) concludes that:
The ideal of national fellowship symbolises a belief in the existence of special ties and obligations
binding the members of a nation. Nationalists view this ideal as the natural outcome of a collective
destiny, a shared culture, and a faith in a common future, emphasising the perception of the nation as
‘a caring community’, where individuals are able to overcome their egoistic inclinations and
cooperate for the sake of mutual prosperity.
What is fascinating about this quotation is that, in terms of the problem we are exploring, it begs
the question. Our problem is, why should our duties to help others in need be focused upon
co-nationals or compatriots? The answer now being offered is that a nation is defined as a
group the members of which owe each other special duties and obligations. In this way, we
have defined the scope of our special duties as the nation of which we are a member and we
have defined a nation as that group of people towards whom we have special duties. We will
need to escape from this circularity in some way.
The way to do this is to understand the mutual recognition and the common awareness of
their distinctiveness that co-nationals have in terms other than mutual obligations or reciprocal
rights. Most arguments that attempt to confine or prioritise duties to fellow members of nations
or states do so by arguing for the intrinsic value of such nations to their members. For example,
Tamir argues that it is an essential and valuable aspect of human existence that it takes place in
the context of communities with shared cultures and values which provide their members with a
strong sense of identity, belonging and embeddedness. She uses the analogy of friendship to
explicate this, saying, ‘Were individuals not ready to dedicate time and effort, and perhaps
even occasionally set aside their own interests for the sake of their friends, they would have
no friends’ (Tamir 1993, 97). This conception of friendship is non-instrumental and not based
on reciprocal expectations or rights. Accordingly the duties that arise from it are genuinely
other-regarding rather than duties of justice. Because they constitute ‘associative obligations’
they permit giving preference to friends in a way that duties of justice do not. Tamir goes on
to use the familiar image of an expanding circle to argue that this model of associative obli-
gations can be extended to the cultural communities or nations to which we feel we belong.
Nevertheless, she says of these further relationships of mutual obligation that, unlike friendships,
they are based on ‘neither love nor sympathy but connectedness, the belief that we all belong to a
group whose existence we consider valuable’ (Tamir 1993, 98).
This notion of ‘connectedness’ becomes central to Tamir’s account of our obligations to
co-nationals or compatriots. She even uses it to argue that the morality of community can, in
fact, lead to a commitment to global justice. Her argument for this proceeds by creating a
variation on Rawls’s original position scenario in which participants are not individualistically
self-interested, but recognise their connectedness and take it into account in designing global
institutions. For Tamir, the participants in the original position cannot suspend their sense of
commitment to fellow members of their communities and will make decisions about basic struc-
tures of justice in the light of their nations’ concerns. I will leave to one side the question of
whether this scenario would yield just global institutions. I want only to highlight the claim
that this variation on Rawls is necessary because of ‘another inherent feature of liberal nation-
alism, namely, its basic assumption that morality is to be grounded on care rather than on mutual
disinterestedness’ (Tamir 1993, 105).
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I applaud this valorisation of care. It suggests that a restricted form of the principle of human-
ity is operative even in this nationalist conception of justice. If the principle of humanity
expresses our caring-about-others, it could be expected to favour those others whom we care
about in specific ways. These may be members of our family, our friends or our co-nationals.
Tamir’s arguments certainly point in this direction. But it depends on an argument by
analogy which assumes that the forms of caring that undergird family, friendship and member-
ship of a nation are all of one kind. While most people agree with the intuition that I may favour
members of my family and friends in my actions (though perhaps not in the social policies or
laws which I support or enact), it is far from obvious that the same kind of motivational justifi-
cation applies to co-nationals. With her mention of care in the restricted context of national
communities, Tamir uses the notion of connectedness to explain how we could care about our
nationalist compatriots. But for a genuine, family-or-friend kind of moral sentiment of caring
to operate between people in a given community, such a community would have to be much
smaller than most national or cultural identity-forming groups. It is not obvious that the
models of family or friendship apply readily to such large communities. Families and friendships
are small and intimate groups, while nations are much larger and more anonymous.4
Moreover, by focusing on her concept of a nation, Tamir fails to see that the grouping which
is morally salient in this debate is the modern nation-state, and that a modern nation-state is a
significantly different kind of entity from that of a culturally cohesive nation. A modern state
is a far larger and more anonymous aggregation of individuals and groups than a nation.
Accordingly, to suggest that there exist subjective relationships of connectedness between
them all may be somewhat fanciful. It might be best, in the case of nation-states, to structure
social and political arrangements in such a way that they protect and honour the rights of
all citizens equally. Caring for one another in this context is unlikely and it will be the
principle of justice that is appropriate at this level of social organisation. And if it is
difficult to use the phenomenon of connectedness to extend caring among members of such
communities as nations to the nation-state, how much more difficult will it be to extend it to
the entire world?
Tamir suggests a link between the principle of humanity and caring-about-others. But by
using the concepts of caring and connectedness, she restricts the principle of humanity to
co-nationals and suggests that this principle licenses the prioritising of co-nationals. While
this account shows that caring-about-others can ground a nationalist form of the principle of
justice, it seems to offer little promise that caring-about-others could be extended to all globally.
National responsibility
David Miller is another theorist who seeks to confine the scope of the principle of justice to co-
nationals. He builds his argument around a distinction between ‘weak cosmopolitanism’, which
advocates an equal concern and moral respect for all, and ‘strong cosmopolitanism’, which says
that everyone should be treated equally. He rejects the second on the grounds that it is not
entailed by the first. Equal concern does not translate into equal treatment. Family, friend or
community relationships show that this does not follow. All people might make an equal
claim on us but it does not follow that we have an equal responsibility to respond to all
claims. If a child from my village goes missing I should help to look for the child, but I have
less of an obligation if it is from another village. Yet it is equally bad when any child goes
missing. Accordingly, even though economic hardship or the absence of social goods is an
evil for anyone, our responsibility to solve such problems could be greater in respect of our
compatriots than it is in respect of others. Miller argues that nations are a source of special
duties and that, ‘Weak cosmopolitanism is consistent with the recognition that we have
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special responsibilities to compatriots in addition to the general responsibilities that we have to
humanity at large’ (D. Miller 2007, 44).
For Miller, a nation is a group with a common identity, a common public and political culture
(but one which contains enough internal variation to necessitate internal debate), and one ‘whose
members recognise special obligations to one another’ (D. Miller 2007, 124). Such an associ-
ation is not purely instrumental and the members generally regard the continued existence of
the nation as an intrinsic good. He argues for this by saying: ‘The way that most people think
about their nationality reveals that its value for them is indeed intrinsic. They would, for
example, profoundly regret the loss of their distinct national identity, even if they were guaran-
teed the other goods that nationality makes possible, stable democracy, social justice, and so
forth’ (D. Miller 2007, 38). However, Miller is begging the moral question. The task of
philosophy is to question the moral validity of this kind of nationalism. One’s sense of national
identity may lead one to acts of ethnic cleansing just as readily as it leads one to acts of civic
responsibility and social justice. Such feelings should not be accepted without moral scrutiny.
Moreover, it could be argued that ‘stable democracy, social justice, and so forth’ are made
possible by the norms of citizenship, not by attachment to nationality. Indeed nationality, under-
stood as group loyalty, often militates against these norms, as has happened in the Balkans and in
Northern Ireland. The treatment of ethnic Palestinians who are Israeli citizens on the part of the
Israeli government is another example.
A further confusion in this quotation is between the notion of ‘nationality’ and the
phenomenon of connectedness with one’s national or cultural group. The latter is what drives
the rhetorical force of Miller and Tamir’s arguments, but the notions of loyalty, solidarity and
preferential treatment which this idea seems to licence should not be attached to the notion of
‘nationality’. Nationality is a matter of citizenship in a modern nation-state. It is a legal and
bureaucratic notion defining who issues your passport and which country’s taxation and
welfare systems you participate in. This is only very contingently related to the cultural,
linguistic, religious, or ethnic group you belong to or even to the land and hearth within
which you locate your roots.
Although nationalism in Miller’s sense distinguishes those to whom one is allowed to give
preference from those who are outside of the scope of prioritised concern, Miller accepts that
everyone has a duty to honour the basic rights of all. There must be a basic minimum provision
for all so as to meet basic human needs and to secure human rights. Once again, however, I
would respond to this point in the way I responded to the similar point made by Slote. How
the poor have been driven to the point where they can no longer eke out a minimally decent
human existence is not irrelevant to the justification of our duties towards them. Merely
caring about their fate may be admirable but we should also be concerned with how they got
into that position.
Indeed, Miller is not unaware of this. He goes on to develop an interesting amalgam of the
principles of justice and of humanity by making use of a distinction between what he calls
‘outcome responsibility’ and ‘remedial responsibility’. An individual or nation has outcome
responsibility for a problem if they have been instrumental in causing it. An individual or
nation has remedial responsibility for a problem if they have accepted or been assigned the
task of fixing it, whether or not they have contributed to bringing the problem about. If a
nation-state were to accept remedial responsibility for acute poverty in a poor country
because of the acute and basic need that existed there, it would do so on humanitarian
grounds. Whereas if a nation-state were to accept the responsibility of alleviating acute
poverty on the grounds that it had been a contributing cause of that poverty, it would be a
response to outcome responsibility and the responsibility would be accepted on the principle
of justice. Outcome responsibility can be insisted upon and policed. A state that causes a
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problem which it then refuses to fix should have sanctions imposed upon it. Remedial respon-
sibility, on the other hand is voluntary. ‘Duties of justice are enforceable, in the sense that
third parties may be justified in applying sanctions to those who default on them; not so with
humanitarian duties’ (D. Miller 2007, 248). Accordingly, ‘Humanitarian duties are in general
less weighty than duties of justice’ (D. Miller 2007, 248).
Along with this mapping of the principle of justice and the principle of humanity onto the
outcome responsibility that nations have and the remedial responsibility which they may volun-
tarily take on, Miller also uses his distinction to show how complicated the allocation of respon-
sibilities can be. If a poor nation shares outcome responsibility for its plight – for example, by
misusing aid money or failing to develop the kind of entrepreneurial culture that would lead to
the alleviation of poverty – a donor nation which might also be causally implicated in the
problem would not have as much outcome responsibility for solving it. In that case, the assist-
ance it offers becomes more humanitarian – although it should still be provided. It cannot be
policed or insisted upon but it is still a duty. Accordingly, when a nation comes to weigh up
the relative strengths of the duties it owes to its own members and to others who are not
members, the considerations can become quite complex. It is not only a matter of adjudicating
between the associative duties that people have towards their co-nationals and the universalist
duties they have towards distant others. It is also a matter of evaluating who bears the
outcome responsibility for the problems and thus owes a duty in justice to solve them as
opposed to those who accept remedial responsibility and thus act on the allegedly less stringent
principle of humanity. By suggesting that many poor states bear some outcome responsibility
for their plight – a suggestion that needs to be backed up with more empirical evidence than
he provides – Miller seeks to reduce the claims that the principle of justice might make
against rich nations. He accepts that rich nations might have duties under the principle of
humanity but insists that these duties, being less stringent, do not override the duties to co-
nationals which national solidarity insists upon.
While Miller does not mention the motivation of caring very often, it is clear that his prior-
itising of the needs of co-nationals is based upon sentiments of national solidarity and the feeling
that national bonds are intrinsically valuable. For him, these moral sentiments justify a nation-
alist form of the principle of justice as well as a qualified form of the principle of humanity.
While this conclusion is consistent with my third hypothesis, I should point out that cosmopo-
litans would question the moral value of this nationalist form of caring-about-others. The other
side of nationalist preference for one’s own is rejection and even hatred of the other. Nationalist
sentiments are forms of caring-about-others, but they should not be taken as prima facie morally
valid bases for discriminating against those who are not co-nationals. The principle of humanity
targets the needs of human beings as such and the principle of justice focuses on universal human
rights. Insofar as they are motivated by caring-about-others, it should be a form of such caring
that acts on the basis of need rather than of national membership.
The political conception of justice
However, it might still be argued that the principle of justice is itself less than global in scope.
Thomas Nagel is but one of the many theorists who questions whether the principle of justice can
be extended to global economic and political arrangements. Rather than appealing to the alleged
phenomenon of connectedness among co-nationals, however, Nagel bases his argument on the
political philosophy of Hobbes for whom justice is a function of national sovereignty. Prior to
the contractual institution of sovereign power, the state of nature – marked as it is by murderous
rivalry over scarce resources for the meeting of basic needs – is one of anarchy and lawlessness.
It is the imposition of the sovereign power that orders this anarchy into a system of cooperation
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and fair exchange. The perceived need for order or the natural willingness to respond to the
needs of others with sympathy will not be sufficient to create an ordered civil society without
the threat of sanctions imposed by a sovereign power. Whether that power is as absolute as
Hobbes envisaged or whether it is itself subject to the democratic will formation does not
detract from its being necessary for establishing the conditions for justice. As Nagel (2005,
116) puts it, ‘Without the enabling condition of sovereignty to confer stability on just insti-
tutions, individuals however morally motivated can only fall back on a pure aspiration for
justice that has no practical expression, apart from the willingness to support just institutions
should they become possible’.
Nagel considers that this point leads to what he calls, following Rawls, the Political
Conception of Justice:
On the political conception, sovereign states are not merely instruments for realizing the preinstitu-
tional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is precisely what gives the value
of justice its application, by putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do
not have with the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the
special standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice. (Nagel 2005, 120)
Accordingly, the scope of justice for a citizen extends no further than the state of which they are
a citizen. It is based upon the political relationships that citizens have to each other rather than
upon any sentiments of caring and connectedness which members of national communities are
said to have towards each other. As Nagel (2005, 121) puts it, ‘Justice is something we owe
through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation.
It is, in the standard terminology, an associative obligation’ (italics in original).
Nagel makes no use of analogies with families and friendships. Most fellow citizens are as
much strangers to me as most citizens of foreign states. It is not any form of moral sentiment or
caring-about-others that grounds the associative obligations that I have to my fellow citizens.
Rather, it is because sovereign power is exercised as a monopoly of force over all citizens
that it is required to be impartial. It is not just that all citizens are engaged, on a contractualist
basis, in a common set of fair exchanges so as to produce security and prosperity for all, but that
they do so under a common sovereign power. This power should be exercised impartially so that
everyone is equal before the law and that no one who is in a position to exercise this power may
do so to their own undeserved advantage. Moreover, the existence of centralised power forces
even those disadvantaged by specific decisions or arrangements to adhere to them. This
creates a presumption that those decisions or arrangements should be fair to all. Nagel (2005,
140) concludes, ‘Justice applies, in other words, only to a form of organisation that claims pol-
itical legitimacy and the right to impose decisions by force, and not to a voluntary association or
contract among independent parties concerned to advance their common interests’.
Accordingly, on the political conception of justice, ‘we are required to accord equal status to
anyone with whom we are joined in a strong and coercively imposed political community’
(Nagel 2005, 133). That we might also be engaged in cooperative ventures with our fellow citi-
zens is secondary. Indeed, we might be engaged in such ventures with others who are not citizens
of our nation-state. But the norms of justice bind only me and my fellow citizens. Indeed, they
should apply to all and only citizens whether or not they participate in the nation’s social and
economic projects. Criminals and the seriously disabled may not participate in these ways,
but they should still be treated justly by the common sovereign authority they are subject to
because, like the rest of the citizens, they are subject to it.
Nagel acknowledges that this political conception of justice may be a convenient view for
those living in rich societies to hold because it relieves the citizens of states of the duty of secur-
ing global justice when such justice is understood, for example, as a global extension of Rawls’s
maximin criteria. However, this does not mean that the rich are relieved of any obligation. Like
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David Miller, Nagel acknowledges a wider context of obligations which extend beyond the
scope of the obligations citizens have to each other. ‘Political institutions create contingent,
selective moral relations, but there are also noncontingent, universal relations in which we
stand to everyone, and political justice is surrounded by this larger moral context’ (Nagel
2005, 131). The global poor have a right to our assistance when they are in dire need.
However, we are not required to correct those aspects of the global system of wealth creation
and distribution which systematically disadvantages the poor for the benefit of the rich.
Without a global sovereign power to enforce such redistributions there can be no injustice in
the resulting inequalities and we have no duties in justice to correct them. Our only duties are
those humanitarian duties that oblige us to meet extreme human needs. If there is to be a correc-
tion in the world system towards greater justice it will come, says Nagel, from the militancy and
activism of the poor rather than from the flimsy generosity of the rich.
Nagel’s thesis does not seem to require a motivational grounding of caring-about-others at
all. Our duties to fellow citizens are purely political while our duties to the rest of humanity
are based on their having human rights. This seems to suggest two differing notions of
justice. Contrasted to the idea of political justice that Nagel is elaborating, there is a more expan-
sive notion of ‘global justice’ which is tied to the notion of universal human rights. Unlike pol-
itical justice, global justice seems to be motivated by caring-about-others. Nagel says that our
respect for human rights is motivated by our ability to imagine the other’s condition. As he
puts it, ‘The normative force of the most basic human rights against violence, enslavement,
and coercion, and of the most basic humanitarian duties of rescue from immediate danger,
depends only on our capacity to put ourselves in other people’s shoes’ (Nagel 2005, 131).
One would have to add, however, that placing oneself in the other’s shoes counts for nothing
if we do not care about the fate of the other. What putting ourselves into the other’s shoes
brings to the motivational set of the agent is the transference of caring about oneself to caring
about the other. The thought process is, ‘I would not want that to happen to me, so I should
do something to prevent it happening to them’. This is an extension of caring about oneself
to caring about others by way of projection and empathy, achieved by being more objective
and adopting the other’s point of view.5 Accordingly, for Nagel, the humanitarian considerations
that apply to non-citizens are motivated by a form of caring-about-others while nationalist
justice is an objective function of political arrangements not motivated by moral sentiments.
A two-tier conception
The picture that is now emerging is that of a two-tier conception of our obligations to others
within which the role of the principles of justice and of humanity, respectively, are intertwined
in complex ways. On the first tier there are obligations to compatriots – whether conceived by
Tamir and Miller as fellow members of our national communities or, more plausibly, by Nagel
as fellow citizens of a nation-state – and on the second tier are obligations to needy foreigners.
The arguments of liberal nationalists like Tamir and Miller present a complex picture of the role
of caring-about-others on these two tiers.6 For Tamir, we are tied to co-nationals by connected-
ness and our caring is focused more strongly upon those with whom we feel such connectedness.
Accordingly, our caring about distant strangers is less strong. For Miller most of our responsibil-
ities to distant strangers are said to be unenforceable government remedial responsibilities and, as
such, take a lower priority than a government’s responsibility to co-nationals. He does not deny
that our caring should be extended globally to all human beings who are in extreme need, but he
argues that national concerns should be given priority because global humanitarian duties are less
stringent. But in acknowledging the possible role of outcome responsibility, he leaves it unclear
whether the basis of our duties to distant strangers is a matter of justice or of humanity. Whether
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they are based on humanity or on justice, however, some form of caring-about-others seems to
underlie both the national scope of justice and the global scope of humanity.
Nagel has a somewhat simpler two-tier model: one in which the first tier is covered by a form
of the principle of justice of which the scope is said to be national while the second tier is covered
by the principle of humanity. And I have argued that, for Nagel, a form of caring motivates his
rights-based version of the principle of humanity.
Conclusion
So now what is there left of the distinction between the principle of justice and the principle of
humanity? Insofar as both are expressions of caring-about-others, it seems that the principle
of humanity and the principle of justice have become inextricably intertwined. My explication
of Tamir, Miller and Nagel has shown that caring-about-others is fundamental to both. Such
caring both explains the normativity of justice as it applies within national and political commu-
nities and extends those norms globally. The nationalist forms of justice which those authors
postulate turn out to be grounded in caring-about-others. But if there are no valid reasons for
the scope of such caring to be confined to the nation, as my critique of their arguments suggests,
then it can only be extended globally. This then makes the principle of justice consistent with a
principle of humanity which recognises only the restriction of need. Given that the two prin-
ciples interact in this way, the scope of the principle of justice should not be limited by
morally questionable restrictions such as nationality, while the principle of humanity can be
used to enlarge the scope of justice and enrich its ethical significance. No clear and consistent
criteria can be established for giving priority to one or other principle and no clear and consistent
distinctions can be drawn between the kinds of duty that arise from either. And so there is no
problem as to which should be accorded priority in any given situation. There are many
reasons for seeking equitable distributions of global resources and for helping the distant
poor, but the motivational grounding of both justice and humanity is based on a form of
caring-about-others that accords recognition to the dignity and rights of all.
Notes
1. This is the burden of Pogge’s (2002) work.
2. In an argument designed to lessen the demandingness of Singer’s conclusion, Richard W. Miller pro-
poses what he calls ‘The Principle of Sympathy: One’s underlying disposition to respond to neediness
as such ought to be sufficiently demanding that giving which would express greater underlying concern
would impose a significant risk of worsening one’s life, if one fulfilled all further responsibilities; and it
need not be any more demanding than this’ (R.W. Miller 2010, 13).
3. As David Miller points out, this is not the same as the problem of partiality versus impartiality (D. Miller
1997, 54).
4. A similar argument is developed by Simmons (1996). (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for
alerting me to this reference.)
5. Nagel elaborates on this process in Nagel (1986, 1991).
6. In an earlier work, David Miller presents a simpler two-tier picture in which we have negative duties to
forbear from violating the rights of strangers on the second tier as well as duties to provide for their vital
needs. Miller concludes that, ‘we are not in most cases required by justice to intervene to safeguard the
human rights of foreigners, though humanitarian considerationsmay lead us to do so’ (D.Miller 1997, 80).
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